We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the space of feasible mechanisms with respect to the above metrics, and observe that two fundamental mechanisms, namely the First-Price (FP) and the Second-Price (SP), lie on the two opposite extrema of this boundary. Furthermore, for the natural class of anonymous task-independent mechanisms, we completely characterize the PoA/PoS Pareto frontier; we design a class of optimal mechanisms SP α that lie exactly on this frontier. In particular, these mechanisms range smoothly, with respect to parameter α ≥ 1 across the frontier, between the First-Price (SP 1 ) and Second-Price (SP ∞ ) mechanisms.
Introduction
The field of algorithmic mechanism design was established in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [35] and has ever since been at the centre of research in the intersection of economics and computer science. The research agenda put forward in [35] advocates the study of approximate solutions to interesting optimization problems, in settings where rational agents are in control of the input parameters. More concretely, the authors of [35] proposed a framework in which, not unlike classical approaches in approximation algorithms, algorithms that operate under certain limitations are evaluated in terms of their approximation ratio. In particular, in algorithmic mechanism design, this constraint comes from the requirement that agents should have the right incentives to always report their inputs truthfully. The corresponding algorithms, paired with appropriately chosen payment functions, are called mechanisms [34] .
Another pioneering line of work, initiated by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [24] and popularized further by Roughgarden and Tardos [38] , studies the inefficiency of games through the notion of the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which measures the deterioration of some objective at the worst-case Nash equilibrium. A more optimistic version of the same principle, where the inefficiency is measured at the best equilibrium [41] , was introduced by Anshelevich et al. [1] under the name of Price of Stability (PoS).
Given the straightforward observation that mechanisms induce games between the agents that control their inputs, as well as the fact that truthfulness is typically a very demanding property, an alternative approach to the framework of Nisan and Ronen [35] is to design mechanisms that perform well in the equilibrium, i.e., they provide good PoA or PoS guarantees. This approach has been adopted, among others, by central papers in the field (e.g., see [42, 39] and references therein) and is by now as much a part of algorithmic mechanism design as the original framework of [35] .
While the literature that studies the concepts of PoA and PoS is long and extensive, there seems to be a lack of a systematic approach investigating the trade-off between the two notions simultaneously. More concretely, given a problem in algorithmic mechanism design, it seems quite natural to explore not only the best mechanisms in terms of the two notions independently, but also the mechanisms that achieve the best trade-off between the two. In a sense, this approach concerns a "tighter" optimality notion, as among a set of mechanisms with an "acceptable" Price of Anarchy guarantee, we would like to identify the ones that provide the best possible Price of Stability. Our contribution in the current paper is the proposal of such a research agenda and its application on the canonical problem in the field, introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [35] , that of scheduling on unrelated machines.
Our contributions
We propose the research agenda of studying systematically the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability in algorithmic mechanism design. Specifically, given a problem at hand and an objective function, we are interested in the trade-off between the PoA and the PoS of mechanisms for the given objective. We apply this approach on the prototypical problem of algorithmic mechanism design studied in [35] , that of unrelated machine scheduling, where the machines are self-interested agents.
First, in Section 3, for the class of all possible mechanisms, we prove that PoA guarantees imply corresponding PoS lower bounds and vice-versa (Theorem 2), which allows us to quantify the possible trade-off between the two inefficiency notions in terms of a feasible region (see Fig. 2 ); we refer to the the boundary of this region as the inefficiency boundary. Interestingly, adaptations of two well-known mechanisms, the First-Price and the Second-Price mechanisms, turn out to lie on the extreme points of this boundary.
Next, in Section 4, for the well-studied class of task-independent and anonymous mechanisms, 1 we are able to show a tighter feasibility region (Theorem 6). As a matter of fact, its inefficiency boundary turns out to completely characterize the achievable trade-off between the PoA and the PoS: we design a class of mechanisms (Section 4.2) called SP α , parameterized by a quantity α, which are optimal in the sense that for any possible trade-off between the two inefficiency notions, there exists a mechanism in the class (i.e., an appropriate choice of α) that exactly achieves this trade-off (Theorems 7 and 8). In other words, we obtain an exact description of the Pareto frontier of inefficiency (see Fig. 3 ).
Our SP α mechanisms are simple and intuitive and are based on the idea of setting reserve prices relatively to the declarations of the fastest machines. While this is clearly not truthful, we prove that it induces the equilibria which are desirable for our results. More precisely, the choice of α enables us to "control" the set of possible equilibria in a way that allows us to achieve any trade-off on the boundary.
Our results also offer insights in an other interesting direction. The inefficiency boundary result for general mechanisms is based on a novel monotonicity lemma (Lemma 1), which is quite different from the well-known weak monotonicity property [40] , (e.g., see [35, 9] ). Interestingly, we also use this lemma to prove a general lower bound of n on the PoA of any mechanism for the scheduling problem (Theorem 1), where n is the number of machines. This result contributes to the interesting debate [23, 20, 11] of whether general mechanisms (that may be non-truthful) can outperform truthful ones, providing a negative answer (see also Section 1.2.2). As a matter of fact, in Theorem 5, we actually show that when evaluated at their worst-case equilibrium, truthful mechanisms are bound to perform poorly, as their PoA is unbounded.
Finally, in Section 5, we conclude with a thorough discussion, where we identify several intriguing directions for future work, both on a technical and a conceptual level.
Related Work

The (Selfish) Scheduling Problem
The scheduling problem on unrelated machines with selfish participants is the prototypical problem studied by Nisan and Ronen [35] in 1999, when they introduced the field of algorithmic mechanism design. The authors consider the worst-case performance of truthful mechanisms on dominant strategy, truth-telling equilibria, and identify that an adaptation of the well-known Second-Price auction 2 has an approximation ratio of n for the problem, where n is the number of machines. Despite several attempts over the years, this is still the best-known truthful mechanism. On the other hand, the succession of the best proven lower bounds started with 2 in [35] , improved to 2.41 in [25] and finally to 2.61 in [9] . Interestingly, Ashlagi et al. [3] showed a matching lower bound of n for anonymous mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that do not take the identities of the machines into account) and whether there is a better mechanism that is not anonymous is still the most prominent open problem in the are. In any case, anonymity is in general a desirable property which is satisfied by most natural mechanisms, including the best possible mechanisms for scheduling; we further discuss the role of this property in our setting in Section 5.2.
Several other variants of the problem have also been considered over the years, such as randomized mechanisms [35, 28, 31] , fractional scheduling [10] , Bayesian scheduling [6, 13, 19] or restricted domains where the processing times come from discrete sets [26] . Alongside the approximation ratio results, there has also been work on structural properties and characterizations [15, 8] . For a more detailed exposition of some of these results, we refer the reader to the survey of Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] .
The Truthful Setting vs. the Strategic Setting
As we mentioned earlier, given that truthfulness is a very demanding requirement which imposes strict constraints on the allocation and payment functions, it is an interesting direction to consider whether non-truthful mechanisms could perform better, when evaluated in the worstcase equilibrium. In other words, for a given problem, one could ask the following question:
"Do there exist (non-truthful) mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy outperforms the approximation ratio guarantee of all truthful mechanisms?".
To differentiate, we will refer to the traditional approach of Nisan and Ronen [35] as the truthful setting and to the setting where all mechanisms are explored (with respect to their Nash equilibria) as the strategic setting.
Koutsoupias [23] studied the truthful setting for the problem of unrelated machine scheduling without money but he explicitly advocated the strategic setting as a future direction. This was later pursued by Giannakopoulos et al. [20] for the same problem, where the authors answered the aforementioned question in the affirmative. The same approach was taken by Christodoulou et al. [11] following the results of Filos-Ratsikas et al. [17] on the limitations of truthful mechanisms for indivisible item allocation. In the literature of auctions, the strategic setting was studied even in domains for which an optimal truthful mechanism (the VCG mechanism) exists, motivated by the fact that non-truthful mechanisms are being employed in practice, with the Generalized Second-Price auction used by Google for the Adwords allocation being a prominent example [5] . We refer the reader to the survey of Roughgarden et al. [39] for more details.
Somewhat surprisingly, although the exploration of different solution concepts besides dominant-strategy equilibria was already explicitly mentioned as a future direction by Nisan and Ronen [35] in their seminal paper, the strategic setting for the scheduling problem was not studied before our paper. As we mentioned earlier, the answer to the highlighted question above here is negative, but the setting proved out to be quite rich in terms of the achievable trade-off between the two different inefficiency notions.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that proposes the systematic study of the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. While we were preparing our manuscript, we became aware that a trade-off between the two notions was very recently considered also by Ramaswamy et al. [37] , though in a fundamentally different setting: they study a special case of covering games, originally introduced by Gairing [18] , which is not inherently a mechanism design setup. One the other hand, our interest is in explicitly studying this trade-off in the area of algorithmic mechanism design, thus choosing the prototypical scheduling problem as the starting point.
Model and Notation
Let R ≥0 = [0, ∞) denote the nonnegative reals and N = {1, 2, . . . } the positive integers. For any n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the strategic scheduling problem (on unrelated machines), there is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of machines and a set J = {1, . . . , m} of tasks. Each machine i has a processing time (or cost) t i,j ≥ 0 for task j. The induced matrix t ∈ R n×m ≥0 is the profile of processing times. For convenience, we will denote by t i = (t i,1 , . . . , t i,m ) the vector of processing times of machine i for the tasks and by t j = (t 1,j , . . . , t n,j ) T the vector of processing times of the machines for task j, so that t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = (t 1 , . . . , t m ) T . The machines are strategic and therefore, when asked, they do not necessarily report their true processing times t but they rather use strategies s ∈ R n×m ≥0 . To emphasize the distinction, we will often refer to t as the profile of true processing times. Adopting standard game-theoretic notation, we use t −i and s −i to denote the profile of true or reported processing times respectively, without the coordinates of the i'th machine.
A (deterministic, direct revelation) mechanism M = (x, p) gets as input a strategy profile s ∈ R n×m reported by the machines and outputs allocation x = x(s) ∈ {0, 1} n×m and payment p = p(s) ∈ R n ≥0 : x i,j is an indicator variable denoting whether or not task j is allocated to machine j, and p i is the payment with which M compensates machine i for taking part in the mechanism. Thus, the allocation rule needs to satisfy i∈N x i,j (s) ≥ 1 for all tasks j.
The utility of machine i under a mechanism M = (x, p), given true running times t i and a reported profile s by the players, is
that is, the payment she receives from M minus the total workload she has to execute. This is exactly the reason why machines may lie about their true processing times; they will change their report s i and deviate to another s i if this improves the above quantity. A stable solution with respect to such best-response selfish behaviour is captured by the well-known notion of an equilibrium. Given a mechanism M and a strategy profile s, we will say that s is a (pure Nash) equilibrium 3 of M (with respect to a true profile t) if, for every machine i and every possible deviation
. Notice here that, in general, pure Nash equilibria do not always exist. In this paper we will study only mechanisms that always do have such equilibria. Formally, if Q M t denotes the set of pure Nash equilibria of mechanism M with respect to true profile t, we will assume that Q M t = ∅ for all t ∈ R n×m ≥0 . Our objective in this paper is to design mechanisms that minimize the makespan
that is, the total completion time if our machines run in parallel. For a matrix t of running times, let OPT(t) denote the optimum makespan, i.e. OPT(t) = min y m j=1 y i,j t i,j where y ranges over all feasible allocation of tasks to machines. It is a well-known phenomenon that equilibria can result in suboptimal solutions, and the following, extensively studied, notions where introduced to quantify exactly this discrepancy: the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) of a scheduling mechanism M on n machines are, respectively,
For simplicity, we will sometimes drop the M, t and s in the notation introduced in this section, whenever it is clear which mechanism and which true or reported profile we are referring to.
Task-Independent Mechanisms
For a significant part of this paper, we will focus on the class of anonymous, task-independent mechanisms. This is a rather natural class of mechanisms; as a matter of fact, two of the arguably most well-studied and used mechanisms in practice, namely the First-Price and Second-Price, lie within this class. Definition 1 (Task-independence). A mechanism M = (x, p) is task-independent if each one of its tasks is allocated independently of the others. Formally, there exists a collection of single-task mechanisms {A j } j=1,...,m , A j = (y j , q j ), such that, for any task j and any machine i,
and
We will refer to the single-task mechanisms A j of the above definition as the components of M. It is important to notice here that the definition does not require the mechanism to necessarily use the same component for all the tasks.
Another standard property in the literature of the problem is anonymity. The property can be defined generally (e.g., see [23] ), but here we will define it for task-independent mechanisms. Definition 2 (Anonymity). A single-task mechanism A = (x, p) is anonymous if, for any inputs s,s such thats = π(s) for some permutation 4 π, it holds that x(s) = π(x(s)) and p(s) = π(p(s)).
A task-independent mechanism M is anonymous, if all its components are anonymous (singletask) mechanisms.
Perhaps the simplest and most natural mechanism that one can think of is the following, which assigns the task to the fastest machine (according to the declared processing times) and pays her her declaration.
Definition 3 (First-Price (FP) mechanism). Assign each task j to the fastest machine ι(j) for it, i.e. ι(j) ∈ arg min i∈N s i,j (breaking ties arbitrarily), paying her her declared running time s ι(i),j ; pay the remaining N \ {ι(j)} machines 0 for task j.
Second-Price mechanisms have also been extensively studied and applied in auction theory, but also in strategic scheduling. As we mentioned in the introduction, the following mechanism is usually referred to as the VCG mechanism in the literature of the problem (see e.g., [7] ):
Definition 4 (Second-Price (SP) mechanism). Assign each task j to the fastest machine ι(j) for it, i.e. ι(j) ∈ arg min i∈N s i,j (breaking ties arbitrarily), paying her the declared processing time of the second-fastest machine, i.e. min i∈N \{ι(j)} s i,j ; pay the remaining N \ {ι(j)} machines 0 for task j.
Notice that both FP and SP mechanisms are task-independent and anonymous. Furthermore, SP is truthful. As a matter of fact, SP is the best known truthful mechanism if one is interested only in dominant strategy equilibria (see, e.g., [35, 9] and Section 2.2).
Solution Concepts and Notions of Inefficiency
The solution concept that we consider in this paper is that of the pure Nash equilibrium. In the literature of the truthful scheduling problem, the employed solution concept is that of the dominant strategy equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile in which no agent would not have an incentive to deviate to any other strategy, for any possible strategy vector of the remaining agents. More precisely, the literature has been interested in truthful mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms for which truth-telling is always (i.e., for any processing time profile t) a dominant strategy equilibrium. The goal is to find a mechanism with the best approximation ratio, which is defined as the worst-case (over all inputs) ratio of the makespan of the mechanism over the optimal makespan, in the truth-telling equilibrium.
For this objective, studying only the truth-telling dominant strategy equilibria is without loss of generality, by the Revelation Principle (see, e.g., [34] ). We remark however that the fact that an allocation function can be implemented in truth-telling dominant strategies (i.e., an appropriate payment function can be found such that the resulting mechanism is truthful) does not have any direct implications on the space of non-truthful mechanisms and their PoA/PoS guarantees.
There are however some inherent relations between the approximation ratio, the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability which follow directly from their definitions. Clearly, a Price of Anarchy guarantee is stronger than a Price of Stability guarantee, since the former bounds the inefficiency of all equilibria while the latter is only concerned with the best one. Since
Best equilibrium (PoS)
Truth-telling profile t
(Approximation Ratio)
All equilibria (PoA) Figure 1 : A pictorial representation of the relation between the different solution concepts and the notions of inefficiency. The picture shows the set of equilibria of a mechanism M for a given true profile of processing times t (they are depicted as a finite set, for convenience, but this need not be the case). The gray area is the set of all strategy profiles s and the blue nodes are the pure Nash equilibria of M on t. The best equilibrium on this profile is drawn with a red boundary (we assume that there is a single best equilibrium for easy of exposition) and the truth-telling profile is drawn with a green boundary. Note that if M is truthful, then the truth-telling profile is a (dominant strategy) equilibrium. The PoA bounds the inefficiency (over all possible profiles t) for all the blue nodes, the PoS bounds the inefficiency for the node with the red boundary and the approximation ratio bounds the inefficiency for the node with the green boundary.
dominant strategy equilibria are also Nash equilibria by definition, for truthful mechanisms, a Price of Anarchy guarantee is also stronger than an approximation ratio guarantee, which, in turn, is stronger than a Price of Stability guarantee. An illustration of the relation between these different notions is given in Fig. 1 .
The Inefficiency of All Mechanisms
We start with a lower bound of n for the Price of Anarchy of the scheduling problem, which applies to all mechanisms. The lower bound will be based on the following monotonicity lemma. We note that this monotonicity property is different from the weak monotonicity (WMON) used in the literature of truthful machine scheduling (see e.g. [35, 9] ) in the sense that (a) it is global, whereas WMON is local and (b) it applies to the relation between the true processing times and the equilibria of the mechanism, rather than the actual allocations. Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Monotonicity). Let M be any mechanism for the scheduling problem. Let t be a profile of true processing times and let s ∈ Q t be an equilibrium under t. Denote by S i the set of tasks assigned to machine i by M on input s. Consider any profilet such that for every machine
s is an equilibrium undert as well.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that s / ∈ Qt, which means that for the profile of processing timeŝ t, there exists some machine i that has a beneficial deviation s i , i.e. u i (s i , s −i |t) > u i (s|t). Let S i be the set of tasks assigned to machine i under report s = (s i , s −i ) (and underlying true reportst). The difference in utility for machine i between profiles s and s is
By the fact that s i is a beneficial deviation, it holds that ∆u i (t) > 0. Now consider the profile of processing times t and the same deviation s i of machine i. The increase in utility now is
Using this lemma, we can prove our first lower bound: Theorem 1. For any scheduling mechanism M for n machines, it must be that PoA(M) ≥ n.
Proof. Let M be any mechanism and consider a profile of true processing times t with n machines and n 2 tasks, where t i,j = 1 for all machines i and all tasks j. Let s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) be a pure Nash equilibrium of M under t. For each machine i, let S i be the set of tasks assigned to that machine and note that there exists some machine k for which
Now consider the following profilet of processing times:
By Lemma 1, the profile s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) is a pure Nash equilibrium undert and the allocation is the same as before, for a makespan of at least n, since machine k is assigned all the tasks in T k . The optimal allocation will assign one task from T k to each machine, the tasks from S i to machine i for each i = k and the tasks from S k \T k to machine k, for a total makespan of 1 and the Price of Anarchy bound follows.
PoA/PoS Trade-off
In this section, we prove our main theorem regarding the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. The theorem informally says that if the Price of Stability of a mechanism is small, then its Price of Anarchy has to be high.
Theorem 2. For any scheduling mechanism M for n ≥ 2 machines, and any real ρ > 1,
Proof. Consider an instance with n players and n tasks. Assume a true n × n processing-times matrix t with
for all i = 2, . . . , n. Here ∞ denotes an arbitrarily large positive value, and actually replacing it with any value M ≥ ρ(n − 1) will work just fine for our proof. First notice that by allocating each task j to machine j with running time t j,j = n − 1, for all j ∈ [n], we get an upper bound of n − 1 on the optimal makespan of t. Thus, since PoS(M) < ρ, there must exist a pure Nash equilibrium profile s such that the allocation M(s ) results in a makespan less than ρ(n − 1) (with respect to the underlying, true time matrix t). But then, due to the structure of t, and in particular the large value of M , M(s ) can only allocate each task j to either machine 1 or machine j, for all j ∈ [n]. In particular, task 1 will necessarily have to be allocated to machine 1. Furthermore, from the remaining n − 1 tasks, not all of them can be allocated to machine 1, because that would give rise to a running time of t 1,1 + n j=2 t 1,j = n − 1 + (n − 1)(ρ − 1) = ρ(n − 1) for machine 1, which violates the Price of Stability constraint assumed for s . So, there must exist at least one task j ≥ 2, denote it by j , such that M(s ) allocates j to machine j.
For each task j, let i j denote the machine which task j is allocated to by M(s ). Now modify the original, true execution time matrix t by changing the running time t i j ,j , for all j = j , to t i j ,j = 0. Denote this new matrix by t . Due to Lemma 1, s has to be a pure Nash equilibrium of M with respect to the modified true profile t as well. But now M(s ) results in a makespan of at least t j ,j = t j ,j = n − 1 (since task j is allocated to machine j ), while allocating j to machine 1 (and leaving all other assignments as they are, i.e. task j = j gets allocated to machine i j ) results in machine 1 having a total running cost of at most (n − 1) · 0 + t 1,j = ρ − 1, and all other machines 0. This gives a Price of Anarchy lower bound of n−1 ρ−1 .
By allowing ρ in Theorem 2 to go arbitrarily close to 1 we get the following: Corollary 1. Even for just two machines, if a scheduling mechanism has an optimal Price of Stability of 1, then its Price of Anarchy has to be unboundedly large.
From the results of the section, we well as the trivial fact that PoA(M) ≥ PoS(M) for any mechanism M, we obtain a feasibility trade-off between the PoA and the PoS of scheduling mechanisms, which is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We refer to the boundary of the shaded feasible region as the inefficiency boundary; the shape of the boundary follows from Theorem 2, as well as Theorem 1, since for any ρ > (n − 1)/n + 1, the largest lower bound on the Price of Anarchy is given by Theorem 1.
Mechanisms on the Extrema of the Inefficiency Boundary
When looking for mechanisms on the Pareto frontier, the first ones that come to mind are perhaps the First-Price (FP) and Second-Price (SP) mechanisms, defined in Section 2, which are straightforward adaptations of the well-known First-Price auction and Second-Price auction mechanisms from the auction literature.
It follows from known results in the literature for the First-Price auction (see, e.g., [16] ) that in every pure Nash equilibrium of the FP, each task is allocated to the machine with the smallest true processing time for the task. In Section 4.2, we will define a class of taskindependent mechanisms (SP α ) that contain FP as a corner case (SP 1 ) and in particular, the following result can also be obtained as corollary of our more general results in Theorem 6, Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, when applied for α = 1. For the Second-Price mechanism, again it follows from known observations in the literature of auctions that while the mechanism is truthful, it has several other pure Nash equilibria as well. More precisely, for a task j ∈ J and any machine i ∈ N , there exists an equilibrium for which task j is allocated to machine i. This immediately implies the following. Theorem 4. For the Second-Price mechanism, the PoA of the mechanism is unbounded and PoS(SP) = 1.
Again, Theorem 4 can be obtained as a corollary of our results in Section 4.2, since SP is also a corner-case mechanism in our class, namely SP ∞ . Interestingly, we identify that the bad PoA bound is inherently present in the constraints that truthfulness enforces on the payment functions. The following theorem highlights that if one is interested in the set of all equilibria, they would have to reach out beyond truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 5. The Price of Anarchy of any truthful mechanism is unbounded.
Proof. Let M = (x, p) be a truthful mechanism on n ≥ 2 machines. To arrive to a contradiction, assume that there exists a real M ≥ 1 such that PoA(M) ≤ M . We will consider singletask instances with only n = 2 machines. This is without loss of generality, since one can add arbitrarily many more machines with 0 running time for the task, and the proof remains valid. In particular, we assume an underlying vector of true running times t = (0, ε), where ε ∈ (0, M −1 ), and a vector s = (1, 0) of reported costs. We first show that M allocates the task to machine i = 2, even if she reports slightly slower running times.
Claim 1.
For any δ ∈ [0, ε], mechanism M always allocates the task to machine i = 2 on any input s = (1, δ).
Proof. First notice that, due to truthfulness, if we consider as true underlying profile t = s = (1, δ), then s has to be an equilibrium. Next, for a contradiction, assume that there exists a nonnegative δ ≤ ε such that x 2 (s ) = 0. Then x 1 (s ) = 1, and thus the makespan under equilibrium s (and true profile t ) would be 1, while an optimal solution would have given the task to the faster machine, for a makespan of δ. This results in a PoA of at least 1 δ ≥ ε −1 > M which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the claim.
Using the same argument, we can also show that M keeps allocating the task to machine i = 2 as long as the other machine has a strictly positive cost: Claim 2. For any δ > 0, mechanism M always allocates the task to machine i = 2 on any input s = (δ, 0).
We are now ready to prove that s is actually an equilibrium: Claim 3. Reporting s = (1, 0) is an equilibrium of M (under true costs t).
The above claim is enough to complete the proof, since by combining it with the previous Claim 1 (with δ = 0) we get that the makespan of M under equilibrium s is ε > 0 (since the task goes to machine i = 2) while the optimal one is 0. This contradicts the fact that PoA(M) is bounded.
Proof of Claim 3. First we remark that, due to well-known characterizations of truthfulness for single-dimensional domains [32] (which apply to our case, since we have a single task), there exist real functions h 1 , h 2 such that the utilities of our machines (with respect to true costs t) on any vector of reports s are given by 6
Furthermore, the allocation function x i (s ) of each player i is monotonically nonincreasing with respect to her reported cost s i . Now we show that the first player has no incentive to deviate from reporting s 1 = 1 as long as the second player is fixed at s 2 = 0. Indeed, currently, and as long as she reports any strictly positive cost s 1 = z > 0, she will still lose the task (i.e., x 1 (z, s 2 ) = 0). That holds due to Claim 2. From (1), this results in a utility of u 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) = h 1 (s 2 ). For the only remaining case that she reports s 1 = 0 , again from (1) we get that u 1 (0, s 2 ) = h 1 (s 2 )−(0−0)·x 1 (0, s 2 ) = h 1 (s 2 ). Thus, in no case the first player can gain by unilaterally deviating.
Finally, we need to show that the second player has no incentive to deviate from reporting s 2 = 0 as well. Assuming the other player fixed at s 1 = 1, the improvement in her utility by declaring a cost s 2 ≥ 0 is (due to (1))
Recall now from Claim 1 that x 1 (1, z) = 1 for all z ∈ [0, ε]. Thus, for s 2 ∈ [0, ε] the above difference in the second player's utility becomes (
the inequality holding due to the fact that x 2 (1, z) is nonincreasing with respect to z. 
The Pareto Frontier of Task-Independent Mechanisms
As we noted in the previous section, both the SP and FP mechanisms, which lie on the inefficiency boundary (see Fig. 2 ), are anonymous task-independent mechanisms. In this section, we will construct a tighter boundary on the PoA/PoS trade-off for the class of anonymous task-independent mechanisms. Furthermore, we will show that this boundary is actually tight, by designing a class of optimal mechanisms that lie exactly on it, meaning that for each point on the boundary, there is a mechanism in our class that achieves the corresponding PoA/PoS trade-off. Thus, this results in a complete characterization of the Pareto frontier between PoA and PoS. 7 For an illustration, see Fig. 3 .
PoA/PoS Trade-off
We start with the theorem that gives us the improved boundary on the space of feasible taskindependent and anonymous mechanisms. This is the red line in Fig. 3 . Theorem 6. For any task-independent anonymous scheduling mechanism M for n machines, and any real α > 1,
Proof. Fix a mechanism M that allocates each task j independently, by running an anonymous single-task mechanism A j . Each such mechanism A j takes as input a declared cost vector s j = (s 1,j , . . . , s n,j ) by the machines, where s i is the report of machine i for task j, i = 1, . . . , n.
Of course, there is also an underlying true cost vector t j = (t 1,j , . . . , t n,j ). Also, fix a parameter α > 1.
We are particularly interested in true cost vectors that have a specific structure, namely being permutations of (1, α, ∞, . . . , ∞). We will call such cost vectors canonical for the remainder of this proof. Equivalently, t j is canonical if:
• there is a unique machine i such that t i ,j = 1 (machine i will be called fast for task j),
• there is a unique machine i such that t i ,j = α (machine i will be called slow for task j),
• all other machines i = i , i have arbitrarily high processing time t i,j = ∞ for task j.
It is important to notice here that, due to anonymity, if s j is a pure Nash equilibrium of mechanism A j under a canonical true cost vector t j , on which A j allocates the task to the slow machine, then under any other canonical true vectort j there has to exist an equilibriumŝ j on which the task is again allocated to the slow machine. More concretely, let π be the permutation such thatt j = π(t j ). Then, because A j is anonymous, its allocation on inputŝ j = π(s j ) is also permuted according to π, thus preserving the assignment of the task to the machines with the same running time between the old and new true vectors. Also, it is easy to see that the exactly analogous argument holds for the allocation to fast machines. Combined with global PoA lower bound of Theorem 1 (green line) and the trivial fact that the PoS is at most PoA (blue line), we finally get the grey feasible region. The family of mechanisms SPα described in Section 4.2 lies exactly on this boundary (red line), thus completely characterizing the Pareto frontier in a smooth way with respect to parameter α ≥ 1: on its one end (α = 1) is the First-Price mechanism FP = SP1 and at the other (α → ∞) the Second-Price mechanism SP = SP∞.
Now consider a true instance t consisting of m ≥ 2n − 3 tasks that all have canonical cost vectors. Further, assume that the PoA of M under t is less than (n − 1)α + 1. We will first argue that, at any equilibrium (under true costs t), M has to allocate at least n − 1 tasks to fast machines. To get to a contradiction, assume that there exists an equilibrium s under which M allocates at most n − 2 tasks to their fast machines. Then, at least m − (n − 2) ≥ n − 1 tasks have to go to their slow machines. Without loss, for simplicity let's assume that that is the case for tasks j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Then, as discussed above, we can permute the cost vectors of these tasks in any way we want, and still be sure that there exists an equilibrium under which all these tasks go to their slow machines.
In particular, consider the following new profile of true costŝ
which results from t by permuting accordingly the canonical task vectors of the first j = 1, . . . , n − 1 tasks, setting the running times of task j = n to be arbitrarily slow except from machine i = n that can execute for a cost of 1, and finally, setting the running times of all other tasks j ≥ n + 1 equal to 0, thus rendering them essentially irrelevant. Then, there exists an equilibrium (ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n−1 ,ŝ n ) that allocates all tasks to machine i = n: for all j ≤ n − 1,ŝ j allocates the task to its slow machine, which happens to be the same for all j, namely i = n; for j = n,ŝ n necessarily gives the task to machine i = n, since it is the only one with a bounded running time. This results in M having a makespan of at least (n − 1)α + 1. On the other hand, assigning tasks according to the diagonal, that is, giving each task j to machine i = j, would result in a makespan of 1. From the above, we deduce that PoA(M) ≥ (n − 1)α + 1, which is a contradiction. Thus, from now on we assume that indeed all equilibria of M, under our initial true costs t, have to allocate at least n − 1 tasks to their fast machines. Without loss, assume now that this is the case for the first j = 1, . . . , n − 1 tasks. Now consider the following modified instancet of true costs, that results from t by permuting the costs vectors of tasks j = 1, . . . , n − 1 so that they all have the same fast machine (namely, i = n), making task j = n having a finite running time of α only for machine n, and rendering all remaining tasks j ≥ n + 1 irrelevant by setting their running times at 0:t
Any equilibriumŝ = (ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n−1 ,ŝ n ) of M undert needs to assign all tasks j = 1, . . . , n −1 to the fast machine, that is, to i = n: otherwise, as we have argued before, there would exist an equilibrium under the original true profile t on which M would allocate one of the tasks j = 1, . . . , n − 1 to a slow machine, which is a contradiction. Thus, any equilibrium equilibrium s results in M having a makespan of (n − 1) + α, while the diagonal allocation ont has a makespan of α. This results in PoS(M) ≥ n−1 α + 1.
Optimal Mechanisms on the Pareto Frontier
Next, we will design a class of mechanisms, parameterized by a quantity α that will populate, in a smooth way, the boundary given by Theorem 6. Thus, these mechanisms achieve trade-offs that lie on the Pareto frontier of inefficiency for the class of task-independent and anonymous mechanisms.
Definition 5 (Second-Price mechanism with α-relative reserve price (SP α )). For α ≥ 1, SP α is the task-independent mechanism that, for each task j: finds a machine k ∈ arg min i∈N s i,j and sets a reserve price at r = α · s k,j ; assigns the task to the fastest machine ι(j) ∈ argmin i∈N s i,j (breaking ties-arbitrarily); pays machine ι(j) the amount min{min i∈N \{ι(j)} s i,j , r}; pays nothing to the remaining machines N \ ι(j).
Informally, for each task j, the mechanism sets a reserve price which is α times larger than the smallest declared processing time, allocates the task to the fastest machine (according to the declarations) and pays the machine the minimum of the second-smallest declared processing time and the reserve price. What this mechanism achieves in terms of the equilibria that it induces is the following: assume that we create a bucket of tasks with true processing times at most α times larger than the smallest true processing time. Then, in every equilibrium of the mechanism, task j is allocated to some machine in the bucket and moreover, for any machine in the bucket, there exists some equilibrium under which SP α allocates the task to that machine. This is captured formally by the following two lemmas. Referencing our discussion in Section 3.1.1, we remark that in the case of SP = SP 1 , the bucket contains only the fastest machine(s) for the task, and in the case of FP = SP ∞ , the bucket contains the whole set of machines.
Lemma 2 ("Nothing outside the bucket"). In any equilibrium of SP α , any task j ∈ J can only be assigned to a machine with processing time at most α · min i∈N t i,j .
Proof. Since SP α is task-independent, it suffices to consider the equilibria of a single component SP j α , corresponding to task j. Let s j be such an equilibrium and without loss of generality, assume that t 1,j ∈ arg min i∈N t i,j , i.e. Machine 1 is the fastest machine according to the true processing times. Assume by contradiction that in s j , some task with real processing time t ,j > α · t 1,j is allocated task j and let s ,j be its report. Since Machine receives the task, it obviously holds that s ,j ∈ arg min i∈N s i,j . We will consider two cases.
Case 1: s ,j ≤ t 1,j . In this case, the reserve price is set at r = α · s ,j ≤ α · t 1,j and Machine receives a payment of at most α · t 1,j . By assumption however, its true processing time is larger than α · t i,j and therefore the machine has negative utility. By deviating to telling the truth, the machine can obtain a nonnegative utility, contradicting the fact that s j is an equilibrium.
Case 2: s ,j > t 1,j . In this case, Machine 1 has 0 utility, since she is not allocated the task and she is not paid anything. However, if Machine 1 deviates to telling the truth, (i.e., if she deviates to s i,j = t 1,j ), then, since s ,j = min i ∈ N s i,j by assumption, the machine will now win the task (i.e., x 1j = 1) and will receive a payment of s ,j > t 1,j , obtaining strictly positive utility. Again, this contradicts the fact that s j is an equilibrium.
In any case, s j can not be an equilibrium in which task j is allocated to some machine with processing time larger than α · min i∈N t i,j . Lemma 3 ("Everything inside the bucket"). For every input profile t, there exist equilibria of SP α such that for every task j, every machine with processing time at most α · min i∈N t i,j can be allocated task j.
Proof. Again, since SP α is task-independent, it suffices to consider the equilibria of a single component SP j α , corresponding to task j. Given an input profile t, let J α be the set of machines i such that t i ,j = α · min i∈N t i,j and let t f = min i∈N t i,j be the processing time of the fastest machine for task j. Let k be any machine in J α and consider the strategy profile s (or rather, its restriction to the j-th component s j ) such that s k,j = t f , s i,j = t k,j for all machines i ∈ J α \ {k} and s i,j = t i,j for all machines i ∈ J \ J α . We will prove that s j is an equilibrium, by considering possible deviations of Machine k, and the remaining machines in J \ {k} separately.
• The current utility of Machine k is 0, since it receives the task for which the true processing time is t k,j and receives a payment of t k,j . Note that the reserve price is set to at most t k,j , since t k,j ≤ α · t f by assumption, and s k,j = t f . Since there exist machines with reported processing times at t k,j , Machine k can not obtain a positive utility by any deviation, even if it increases the reserve price while still winning the task.
• Consider any machine i ∈ J \ {k}. Since Machine i is not winning the task, its utility is 0, and the only way to possibly obtain a positive utility is by forcing an allocation in which it wins the task. For this to be possible, it has to deviate to s i,j ≤ t f = s k,j , as otherwise Machine k would still be the winner. In that case however, the payment of Machine i will be at most t f and by assumption, we know that t i,j ≥ t f for any task j ∈ J. Therefore, the deviation results in a utility of at most 0 for Machine i and it is not a beneficial deviation.
In any case, there is no beneficial deviation for any machine, and s j is an equilibrium.
Theorem 7. The Price of Anarchy of SP α on n machines is at most (n − 1)α + 1.
Proof. Fix some underlying n × m true cost matrix t and a parameter α > 1. Fix also an optimal (makespan-minimizing) allocation OPT of t and a (pure) Nash equilibrium s of SP α under true costs t. For any task j = 1, . . . , m, let ι * (j) and ι(j) denote the machine that gets task j at OPT and SP α (s), respectively. Also, let K * i , K i denote the corresponding machine loads and J * i , J i the sets of assigned tasks; that is, for i = 1, . . . , n, we define
where
Finally, it is without loss of generality to assume that K 1 ≥ K 2 ≥ · · · ≥ K n , so that the makespan of SP α on s is
after allocating only the large tasks according to OPT and s, respectively. That is, we formally define:
Without loss, let's assume that K 1 ≥ K 2 ≥ · · · ≥ K n . Then, the makespan of OPT is
while that of s can be upper bounded by
where the second to last inequality holds due to the fact that for large tasks
and the last one holds due to α ≥ 1.
Putting everything together, and denoting for simplicity x = K 1 + L * 1 and y = n i=2 L * i , we have that
the last inequality holding by applying Lemma 4 with β = 1 α and γ = 1 n−1 .
Discussion and Future Directions
In this section, we discuss some implications of our approach, as well as directions for future work. On a general level, one could apply our framework of studying the inefficiency trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability to many other problems in algorithmic mechanism design, such as auctions [29, 42] , machine scheduling without money [23, 20] , or resource allocation [11] , to name a few, for which the two inefficiency notions have already been studied separately.
In terms of the strategic scheduling setting, our work gives rise to a plethora of intriguing questions for future work, both on a technical and a conceptual level, which we highlight below in more detail.
General Mechanisms
The major open question associated with our work is whether there exists a mechanism that achieves a better trade-off than that of Theorem 6, or in other words, "Is the yellow region of Fig. 3 
empty or not?"
If such a mechanism exists, it will most probably have to not be task-independent 8 ; this is somewhat reminiscent of the state-of-the-art results in truthful machine scheduling, where the best possible mechanisms (with respect to the approximation ratio, see Section 2.2) for several variants of the problem are in fact task-independent [36, 10] and whether a better mechanism that is not task-independent exists is a prominent open question.
While in the case of truthful mechanisms, the general consensus is that the best achievable mechanisms will in fact eventually proven to be task-independent, the situation in the strategic version of the problem might be quite different. This is because we have all possible mechanisms at our disposal and it is more conceivable that some allocation rule, tied with some appropriate payment function could potentially outperform the trade-off bounds of Theorem 6. This seems, however, like a quite challenging task; to offer some intuition, we remark the following about the design of general mechanisms for the problem.
The most natural idea is perhaps to use a known algorithm for unrelated machine scheduling [22, 14, 27] such as the greedy allocation algorithm 9 of Ibarra and Kim [22] , or even the makespan-optimal algorithm and couple them with a "get-paid-your-load" payment function, where each machine receives a monetary compensation equal to the sum of the reported processing times for the tasks that she gets assigned. This is essentially the generalization of the payment rule of the First-Price mechanism for more general allocation rules. The hope is that by virtue of having a more efficient allocation rule, the resulting mechanism will always have equilibria with small makespan (good PoS) while never having equilibria with very large makespan (good PoA). Unfortunately, one can show that for a large class of such allocation algorithms (which includes all the aforementioned algorithms that have been proposed in the literature for the classical unrelated machine scheduling problem), the Price of Anarchy of the resulting mechanism will be unbounded.
Overall, for a mechanism to lie in the yellow region of Fig. 3 , it seems imperative that it will need to employ some more complicated payment function, which will "guide" the agents towards the desired equilibria, rather than simply attempt to implement a better allocation rule with known payment structures.
The Role of Anonymity
In the proof of Theorem 6, we used the fact that the mechanism in question is anonymous. In many cases in the general related literature, this assumption is without loss of generality, as the best possible mechanisms with respect to an objective are anonymous. In the literature of the unrelated machine scheduling problem in algorithmic mechanism design however, understanding the role of anonymity is a long-standing open problem. In particular, while all the known mechanisms for several variants of the problem are anonymous, the best-known lower bounds for anonymous and non-anonymous mechanisms are strikingly different, from, specifically n in the former case (given by [3] and matching the best-known upper bound of [36] ) and 2.61 in the latter case (given by [9] ).
In our strategic scheduling problem, anonymity becomes even harder to reason about, since it is a property that applies to the reported strategy profiles and not the underlying true valuations, and the arguments regarding permutations of the underlying true profiles have to be made carefully with regard to the equilibria that they induce, as in our approach in the proof of Theorem 6. Nevertheless, for general (not necessarily anonymous) task-independent mechanisms, we can still show the following inefficiency trade-off. Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 9. For any task-independent scheduling mechanism M for n machines, and any real α > 1,
The above is a strict improvement with respect to the general boundary given by Theorem 2, but still does not quite match the Pareto frontier that we proved for anonymous mechanisms. In other words, the inefficiency boundary given by Theorem 9 lies strictly within the yellow area in Fig. 3 . Obtaining tight bounds is an interesting open problem.
Equilibrium Notion Considerations
In this paper, we study the set of all possible equilibria of mechanisms for the problem, which may include equilibria which are weakly dominated (e.g. see [33, Sec. 1.8] ), i.e., the agents could use a different strategy instead of their equilibrium strategy and obtain the same utilities, regardless of the reports of the other agents. This type of equilibria are known to exist in the Second-Price mechanism and our class of mechanisms SP α also exhibits such equilibria. In order to quantify this type of equilibria in terms of the agents' aversion to risk, Babaioff et al. [4] defined the notion of exposure factor, which measures the amount of risk that an agent is willing to expose herself to, when best-responding. In the terminology of our setting, the exposure γ of strategy s i is such that
where s −i is any vector of strategies of the other machines and S i is the set of tasks assigned to machine i under x(s i , s −i ). In simple words, γ is used to quantify how much extra cost agent i could possibly experience, if all other agents coordinated to a strategy that is the worst possible for the agent. Then, Babaioff et al. [4] proceed to define the set Q γ t as the set of all equilibria that consist only of strategies with exposure factor at most γ and the corresponding notion of the Price of Anarchy with the respect to this equilibrium set. Given a parameter α, mechanism SP α can be seen as achieving a PoS guarantee even with respect to the set Q α−1 t of equilibria consisting of strategies of exposure at most α − 1. Conceptually, even if one is only willing to accept a certain level of risk exposure, an appropriate β can be chosen and the corresponding mechanisms SP α for α ≤ β, will lie on the inefficiency boundary, even if the solution concept is the γ-exposure Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, Theorem 6 holds for any such parameter γ and in particular, it holds for γ = 0, i.e., when we only consider undominated Nash equilibria. Whether there exists a mechanism that can match, in undominated equilibria, the guarantees of SP α , is an interesting open question; we believe though that this is rather unlikely. That being said, proving impossibility results for general classes of mechanisms seems quite challenging, as the property of not being dominated does not convey much information from a technical standpoint and in particular has different implications for different mechanisms. This is in contrast with the more standard approach in auctions, where specific mechanisms have been studied, for which undominated strategies implies a very handy non-overbidding property, e.g., see [16, 30] .
Computational Considerations
As we mentioned earlier, the mechanisms that we construct in this paper (see Definition 5) are rather simple and run in polynomial time, and this is actually the case for all known mechanisms for the truthful scheduling problem as well. It would be interesting to investigate whether adding computational efficiency as a desirable property of the mechanisms in question can have any implications on the inefficiency boundary. For truthful scheduling, this is unlikely to be an issue, since the constraint of truthfulness itself typically leads to rather simple mechanisms which are easily seen to be efficient. As we hinted in Section 5.1 however, it is conceivable that from the space of all possible mechanisms that we can use, the best one might employ an allocation algorithm that is computationally intractable. Concretely, it could be possible that the makespan-optimal algorithm (which does not run in polynomial time, unless P=NP [27] ) can be coupled with an appropriate payment function to achieve a better trade-off guarantee. From this discussion, we deduce the following, very interesting question:
"If we add computational efficiency as a constraint, can we prove a stronger inefficiency boundary than that of Fig. 2?." Conceptually, the question above regards whether there is a fundamental connection between the running time of the allocation rule and the PoA/PoS trade-off that can be explored via a corresponding inefficiency boundary.
Since the a ij are partitioned by the n distinct values of j, there must be some j for which:
leading to a contradiction.
This result is essentially tight. For any δ > 0 consider the matrix:
where every column sum is < (n − 1)α/ √ 2 and for every row i and nonempty J ⊆ [n] \ {i}:
B Proof of Theorem 9
Without loss of generality, we assume that mechanism M allocates each task-independently by running the same single-task mechanism for every task. The reason the analysis carries over, is that we will only use tasks drawn from a finite pool. Restricted to these profiles of true processing times, there are only finitely many essentially different single-task mechanisms, when the difference is measured from the perspective of allocations. Therefore, even if the task-independent mechanism M used a different one for every task, we could always find n single-component mechanisms operating the same way. For a rigorous treatment, please we refer the reader to Lemma 6. We aim to identify some "weakness" of M by discovering, for canonical instances that are permutations of the true processing times (1, x, ∞, ∞, . . .), just how much larger x can get, so that there exists some equilibrium under which the task is allocated to the slow machine. We refer to the machine with processing time 1 as the fast machine and to the other, which does not have a processing time of ∞, as the slow machine. As the mechanism is not anonymous, there might be a different x for every permutation.
Formally, fix α (n−1) √ 2 ≥ ε > 0 and for i, j = 1, . . . , n and i = j, let a i,j = max k∈N    k · ε for t i,j = (. . . , 1 i , . . . , k · ε j , . . .), ∃s i,j s.t. machine j is allocated the task    be the maximum processing time of the slow machine, when the fast machine has index i, the slow machine has index j and the slow machine can still receive the task for some equilibrium.
To ensure that Lemma 6 can be applied, we need to discretize the processing times, in order to have a finite number of possible tasks. Letā i,j = a i,j + ε. Clearly, if a i,j is replaced byā i,j in its canonical instance then the only allocation remaining will be to give the task to the fast machine. We call this instancet i,j . For convenience, we also set a i,i =ā i,i = 0.
Next, observe that 0 < a i,j < (n − 1)α/ √ 2 for all i = j. The upper bound is due to the assumption on the PoA, which would otherwise be violated for t i,j . For the lower bound, the instancet i,j would have PoA ≥ 1/ε, leading to a contradiction, for some small enough ε.
Fixing j, we create the following profile of true processing times: t j = (t 1,j , . . . , t (i−1),j , f , t (i+1),j , . . . , t n,j ),
where f contains only one entry that is not ∞, at row j. Presented in a more convenient matrix form:
1 ∞ ∞ · · · ∞ ∞ a 1,j a 2,j · · · a (j−1),j 1 a (j+1),j · · · a (n−1),j a n,j ∞ ∞ · · · ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ · · · ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The lower bound on the PoS can be further improved by restricting the input to only contain a nonempty subset J ⊆ [n] \ {i} of the tasks, plus task i which is special. This reduces the makespan of both M and the optimal, but the overall fraction could increase. Notice that task i (which has only one entry which is not ∞, adjusted to be the maximum amongst the |J| selectedā i,j ) is always added, as it increases M's makespan for free. In particular:
PoS ≥ max This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 9 shows that foregoing anonymity cannot lead to mechanisms with asymptotically tighter Pareto frontiers. Moreover, it leads the the following observations. Most likely, if there exists a stronger bound, it cannot be obtained with our canonical tasks and would need to use a richer input. At the same time, if a non-anonymous mechanism that achieves a better trade-off than that given by Theorem 6 does exist, the matrix at the end of Lemma 5 could provide some insight on what that mechanism could look like, at least when restricted to these tasks. Lemma 6. Theorem 9 holds for all task-independent mechanisms M.
Proof. Continuing from our note in the beginning of Theorem 9, we show that given a taskindependent mechanism M, it is always possible to find n single-task component mechanisms that behave the same way for the very specific inputs needed for the lower bounds. Notice that in the proof of Theorem 9 the tasks we used all come from a finite set of true processing times C. In particular, C contains all the permutations of (1, a, ∞, ∞, . . . , ∞), where a is of the form k · ε and 0 < a < (n − 1) · α/ √ 2 + ε. Therefore: |C| = n(n − 1) (n − 1) · α/ √ 2 ε . Fix a single-task mechanism A. For a true processing time vector t ∈ C, call machine j accessible from t if there exists an equilibrium for which the task is assigned to that machine. Let ACC (t) be the set of accessible machines for component A for that t and B(A) be the behaviour set of A, defined as B(A) = {(t, ACC (t)) | t ∈ C } .
This fully characterizes A from the perspective of accessible allocations for tasks in C. Note that for two different single-task mechanisms A 1 and A 2 , it could be that B(A 1 ) = B(A 2 ) without them being the same mechanism: they must however reach the same allocations given the same t (potentially through different equilibria). Clearly, ACC (t) can be one of 2 n − 1 possible sets. This is because ACC (t) can be any subset of the n machines, except the empty subset, since each task has to be allocated to some machine at every equilibrium. This is however all we need in Theorem 9. Therefore, the total number of behaviour sets is at most:
(2 n − 1) |C| , which is quite large, but bounded.
Let A j be the single-task mechanisms used by mechanism M for the j'th task, given an input with n(2 n − 1) |C| tasks from C in total. By the pidgeonhole principle, there must be at least n such single-task mechanisms with the same behaviour set. Setting all other tasks to have real processing times 0 for all tasks, we have successfully extracted a mechanism M that behaves exactly as needed for Theorem 9.
